What is the doctrine of divine simplicity, and why is it illogical?

The doctrine of divine simplicity teaches that Allāh (God) is not composed of parts. Sunnī Muslims would agree that Allāh is not composed of parts because this would entail contingency and dependency. However, the proponents of divine simplicity go to the extent of claiming that Allāh has no real distinctions with respect to himself. Take for example the ṣifāt (attributes) of Allāh, such as omniscience, omnipotence, will, all-hearing, all-seeing, love, wrath, and so on. The doctrine of divine simplicity teaches that Allāh does not possess these ṣifāt but that he is identical to them. This cannot be true because this would necessitate that these ṣifāt are identical to each other.

1. According to divine simplicity, Allāh is identical to his ṣifāt.
2. If so, then each ṣifah (attribute) is identical to each other.
3. The ṣifāt are not identical to each other.
4. Therefore, divine simplicity is false.

This syllogism is valid and now the premises will be evaluated. The first premise is a given. As for the second premise, this is a consequence of divine simplicity. If Allāh is identical to his ṣifāt, then Allāh is identical to love, wrath, and so on. This entails that love is identical to wrath. To put it simply, let a represent Allāh, b represent love, and c represent wrath. If a=b and a=c, then b=c. Premise three states that the ṣifāt are not identical to each other, as love is clearly not the same as wrath, so divine simplicity must be false, and the syllogism is sound. There are many more arguments that can be made to refute this doctrine, but some of the motivations of why proponents adhere to this doctrine will be mentioned and rebutted.

As for Christianity, Catholics and most Protestants affirm the doctrine. It is strange for Trinitarians to affirm divine simplicity when they believe there is one God who is simultaneously three distinct persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. As for Islām, the Muʿtazilah are the most famous sect for championing divine simplicity. The Muʿtazilah labelled themselves as Ahl al-ʿAdl wa at-Tawḥīd, which means the People of Justice and Tawḥīd. Tawḥīd is a person’s affirmation of divine oneness (waḥdah), and it is the most important teaching of Islām. The reason why they labelled themselves as the People of Justice was because they believed it was unjust for Allāh to create a person’s wicked actions and then to punish this individual for these actions. Thus, they believed that man should only be held morally responsible if he is the creator of his own actions. This objection has already been answered in the Reconciling Predestination and Free Will article.

Do multiple necessary attributes necessitate multiple necessary beings?

As for the reason why the Muʿtazilah labelled themselves as the People of Tawḥīd, they believed that to distinguish between Allāh and his ṣifāt would necessitate the existence of multiple necessary and eternal beings. It has already been proven in the Monotheism and the Impossibility of Emanationism article that there can only be one necessary and eternal being in existence. If so, then how can Sunnīs reject divine simplicity while affirming that there is only one necessary and eternal being in existence? The answer is that the ṣifāt are distinct yet inseparable from Allāh. The Sunnī formulation is wa hiya lā huwa wa lā ghayruhu, which means they (the ṣifāt) are not him (Allāh), nor are they other than him. The statement that the ṣifāt are not Allāh means that they are not identical to him, so it is incorrect to say Allāh is omniscience. As for the statement that the ṣifāt are not other than Allāh, what this means is that they are not separable from him, and they are not a part of creation [1].

A being is anything that exists, but the ṣifāt are inseparable from Allāh, so they are not beings in of themselves, but they subsist in the divine essence or entity (dhāt) of Allāh. The dhāt of Allāh is his very being, while the ṣifāt are his attributes and qualities [2]. Power, knowledge, or similar ṣifāt cannot exist without a being possessing these qualities [3]. This solves the problem of multiplicity. If the ṣifāt existed apart from Allāh, then there would indeed be multiple necessary beings. If one insists that Allāh possessing multiple necessary attributes entails the existence of multiple necessary beings, then one should be consistent and claim that a person with multiple attributes is actually multiple people, which is absurd.

The problem of composition and dependency: is the essence dependent upon the attributes, or are the attributes dependent upon the essence?

Proponents of divine simplicity say that all that exists of Allāh his is very own dhāt (divine essence), which is independent, and if it is said that the divine essence is dependent upon itself, then this is still independence because to depend upon yourself and no one else is what it means to be independent. Proponents of divine simplicity say that to reject the doctrine entails composition because if the ṣifāt are not identical to Allāh but subsist in his essence, then they must be parts. The question that follows is: what is meant by ‘parts’? If they mean physical parts, then this is obviously incorrect. Allāh’s ṣifāt are not such that they are stacked together to form Allāh just as bricks are stacked together to form a building.

Proponents of divine simplicity may ask that if the dhāt of Allāh is not identical to the ṣifāt, then the dhāt must be dependent upon the ṣifāt, or the ṣifāt must be dependent upon the dhāt. They should clarify what they mean by 'dependent'? If they say that the dhāt is dependent because it receives existence from the ṣifāt, then this is incorrect because the dhāt is necessary in existence. Likewise, the ṣifāt are not dependent upon the dhāt in that they do not receive their existence from the dhāt because they were not created by it. However, the ṣifāt are dependent in the sense that they cannot exist unless they are possessed by a dhāt [4]. Nevertheless, the word 'dependent' should not be used because some may misunderstand this to mean that the ṣifāt receive their existence from the dhāt. Instead, it should be said that the dhāt is necessary in existence, and the ṣifāt are necessary qualities of the dhāt, and the dhāt does not receive existence from the ṣifāt, nor do the ṣifāt receive existence from the dhāt, but they are eternally linked.

Additionally, if a proponent of divine simplicity says that if Allāh is not identical to his ṣifāt, then he must depend upon his omnipotence in order to create, and since Allāh's ṣifah of omnipotence is not identical to Allāh, then Allāh is dependent because he must depend upon on something other than himself to create. The answer to this allegation is that Allāh's ṣifāt are inseparable, so for Allāh to be able to create due to his omnipotence does not entail dependency because the ṣifāt are not separate and external entities. Just as it is said that the divine essence's dependence upon itself does not compromise its independence, as true independence means relying on nothing beyond oneself, so too a being remains independent even if it acts using its own inherent qualities. Dependence on one's own qualities does not negate independence because those qualities are inseparably linked to the being itself. If one insists that to be dependent upon one's own qualities in order to perform an act negates independence, then this is like a student who uses his own knowledge to pass an exam, but the teacher accuses the student of cheating and says, "I told you to only use yourself and to not cheat by using others to help you, but you cheated by using your own knowledge to help you with the exam. You are not identical to your knowledge, so you cheated by using something other than yourself to aid you in taking the exam." The teacher's response in this scenario is blatantly absurd [5].

[1] The formulation appears to be a logical contradiction and a violation of the law of excluded middle. For example, to say that an integer is neither odd nor even would violate the law of excluded middle because an integer must be either odd or even as these predicates are mutually exclusive. However, if it is said that a shirt is neither black nor white, then this would not violate the law of excluded middle because these predicates are not mutually exclusive. A shirt can be neither black nor white as it can be red, yellow, blue, and so on. As for the formulation mentioned, one may think that if the ṣifāt are not Allāh, then they must be other than Allāh, but what Sunnīs mean by the statement that the ṣifāt are not other than Allāh is that they are not separable from him, and they are not a part of creation. Indeed, this formulation is correct in meaning, but the way it is worded can easily be misunderstood as a logical contradiction and violation of the law of excluded middle. It would perhaps be clearer to say that the ṣifāt are neither Allāh, nor are they separate from Allāh.
[2] Allāh is the divine essence (dhāt), but more specifically, Allāh refers to the divine essence that is ascribed with ṣifāt. Therefore, while it is common to say the ṣifāt are not Allāh, nor are they separate from him, it is more accurate to instead say the ṣifāt are not the divine essence, nor are they separate from the divine essence.
[3] Some ṣifāt can exist without a possessor, while others require one. For example, if a human has an amputation, the amputated limb can still exist without being attached to the original body. This limb is a ṣifah that can exist without a possessor, meaning the original body that it was attached to. Power, on the other hand, is an example of a ṣifah that cannot exist without a possessor because it does not exist by itself.
[4] See the third footnote.
[5] For a more detailed refutation of divine simplicity, it is highly recommended to read Dr. Nazif Muhtaroğlu's paper on divine simplicity, which can be read at https://isamveri.org/pdfdrg/D03265/2020_2/2020_2_MUHTAROGLUN.pdf.