Free will remains as one of the most controversial and debated subjects in theology, philosophy, and the natural sciences. Indeed, this article will not do justice to this topic, as entire volumes can be written on this subject alone. Instead, this article will only serve as a concise explanation and defense of Sunnī Islām’s views on this subject.

Foreknowledge

One of the arkān (pillars) of īmān (faith) is belief in Qadr (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 8). This article of faith essentially centers on the concept of destiny. A key aspect of Qadr is divine foreknowledge. Allāh (God) has the knowledge of all events, including future human actions (Qurʾān 2:255). According to a Ḥadīth, Allāh created a pen and commanded it to write and record everything that would occur until the end of this world (Sunan Abī Dāwūd 4700). To believe that anything escapes the knowledge of Allāh renders one a kāfir (disbeliever), thus one cannot be a believer unless one affirms Allāh’s omniscience; subsequently, one must affirm divine foreknowledge.

A common question that is often raised is that if Allāh knows everything an individual would do with absolute certainty, then how could such a person be morally responsible for any action, since every action is ultimately inevitable due to the perfect foreknowledge of Allāh? The answer is that Allāh's foreknowledge does not cause a person to commit a particular act. To help explain, imagine an observer watching a customer being offered a choice of ice cream flavors, and the customer chooses to buy chocolate ice cream. Now consider that this observer has a time machine and is able to return to the past while retaining knowledge of the present. This person returns to the past and does not do anything differently so that the course of events remains the same. The person then again observes that the customer has chosen to purchase chocolate ice cream, just as before. This observer's foreknowledge of the outcome did not determine the outcome. Similarly, Allāh's foreknowledge of someone's choices does not determine their choices. Therefore, there is no conflict between divine foreknowledge and human free will [1] [2].

Determinism, randomness, and libertarianism

It is important to note that divine foreknowledge is only one aspect of Qadr. The Sunnī understanding of Qadr is comprised of four main components:

1. The omniscience and foreknowledge of Allāh.
2. The will of Allāh.
3. The writing and recording of everything that will take place.
4. The creative action of Allāh [3].

Allāh does not only foreknow what will happen but has also determined what will happen with his divine will. As mentioned earlier, the Pen has recorded everything that will transpire until the end of this worldly life (dunyā). Moreover, Muslims believe that Allāh is the Creator of everything, and so everything that occurs is due to the creative action of Allāh.

To understand Qadr in more detail, it is important to first introduce the concept of determinism. Determinism is the metaphysical view that all events, including human decisions, are causally inevitable, which means that every event is guaranteed to occur due to some prior condition or cause, so if a person makes a particular decision, then this person could not have done otherwise. Causal inevitability is not to be conflated with the inevitability that arises from divine foreknowledge. Inevitability can have two definitions: certain to happen or unavoidable. One could believe in divine foreknowledge while rejecting determinism. For instance, say that Allāh knows that Zayd will choose to eat chocolate ice cream. Zayd's action was inevitable in the sense that it was certain to happen because Allāh foreknew it, but, if one rejects determinism, then one could say that Zayd's action was not unavoidable because Zayd could have done otherwise. However, if determinism is true, not only was Zayd's action certain to happen, it was also unavoidable because Zayd could not have done otherwise. The reason why Zayd could not have done otherwise is because his action was determined, meaning a preceding condition or cause caused his action.

Some claim that determinism is incompatible with free will. Assume for the sake of argument that determinism is false. How would one reconcile free will with indeterminism? One could reject determinism by believing that things can occur without cause, which is to say that they are truly random. However, it is impossible for anything to occur without a cause, as mentioned in the article concerning the contingency argument. Furthermore, a person does not have control over what is truly random, so one cannot affirm the notion of free will while believing that the actions of people can occur randomly without any cause whatsoever.

However, a rejection of determinism does not necessitate a rejection of causality and an affirmation of true randomness. One could reject determinism by rejecting that all events are determined while maintaining the view that some events are determined. According to the metaphysics of libertarianism, free will is incompatible with determinism. Libertarians believe determinism is false because they believe that people have libertarian free will, which is the view that a person could have genuinely chosen to act differently in a given scenario, even with the same prior conditions and circumstances; this is essentially a rejection of causal inevitability. Of course, libertarians believe that prior conditions can influence a person’s action, but they do not believe that these conditions determine a person’s action. If prior conditions do not cause a person’s actions, then what does? Libertarians believe that agents themselves determine and cause their own actions. Thus, libertarians hold true to the principle of causality because they do not deny that a person’s actions have a cause, but they deny determinism because they believe agents determine and cause their own actions and could have chosen otherwise, and this is a rejection of causal inevitability and an affirmation of libertarian free will.

Libertarianism may sound appealing because it holds the view that people could have chosen to do otherwise, but it can be demonstrated that libertarianism is false.

1. Libertarianism claims that people cause their own actions without being determined to do so by any cause besides their will.
2. Causing an action to come into existence is itself an act that requires a cause.
3. Therefore, the act of causing an action also requires a cause.
4. This process leads to either an infinite regress of internal actions within a person or a termination at something external to a person.
5. Infinite regress is impossible.
6. Therefore, the chain of causes terminates at something external to a person.
7. Therefore, libertarianism is false.

This syllogism is valid. The first premise simply defines the core claim of libertarianism. Libertarians believe that if a person, say Zayd, chose chocolate ice cream over strawberry ice cream, then it was Zayd who caused his own action with his own will. The second premise states that causing an action to come into existence is itself an action. This leads to an important question: even if Zayd caused his own action with his own will, what caused Zayd to will to choose chocolate ice cream over strawberry ice cream? Libertarians would not want to say that Zayd’s intention was determined by anything besides Zayd’s very own will, so perhaps Zayd willed to will to choose chocolate ice cream over strawberry ice cream. However, even this intention would also require a cause, which is precisely the point made by the third premise; if this chain of internal causes and intentions continued indefinitely, then an infinite regress would be required to perform even a single action. Therefore, there must be a first intention within a person, but what is the cause of this intention? It cannot arise from a prior internal intention, since it is the first intention, and it cannot come into existence without a cause, as nothing can begin to exist without a cause. This intention is not beginningless because human beings are contingent and not beginningless, which means that their intentions had beginnings. Therefore, it follows that the first intention must be caused by something external to the person.

The soundness of this syllogism could be challenged by questioning the second and fifth premises. As for the second premise, it may be argued that to cause or intend to perform an action can occur simultaneously with the action itself. For instance, a person can performing the action of running while having the intention of running at the same time. This is a fair point, but it overlooks an important fact: the decision or intention to act can arise before the action takes place. An individual could have the intention to run while remaining seated. The individual could then begin to run after this intention. This demonstrates that the intention and the action that follows the intention are not identical.

As for the fifth premise, infinite regress has been demonstrated to be impossible in the article concerning the contingency argument. An infinite regress means that there is no first cause, which makes it impossible to fully account for why any action occurs at all. Without a starting point, the entire chain of causes lacks grounding. Therefore, an infinite regress of internal causes does not provide a complete explanation for why the chain of internal causes exists, and so an external determiner is required.

Occasionalism and secondary causation

The question that follows is who or what is this external determiner? Sunnīs understand Allāh to be Al-Muqtadir (the Determiner), as he is Al-Khāliq (the Creator) of everything.

Sunnīs have expressed a diverse range of views regarding the details of Allāh's creative activity. One of these views is occasionalism, which is mainly upheld by the Ashʿarī madhhab (school) of ʿaqīdah (creed). According to the Ashāʿirah, Allāh is the direct and sole cause of every event in the world, meaning there is no secondary causation. For example, if a person brings cotton into contact with fire and the cotton burns, it is not the fire that causes the burning. Rather, Allāh creates the cotton, the fire, the person, the person's action of bringing the cotton to the fire, and the burning itself. In this model, Allāh creates the burn upon the occasion of the cotton coming into contact with the fire [4].

Other Sunnī theologians, such as some of the Māturīdīyyah and the Ḥanābilah, affirmed secondary causation. According to their view, when cotton comes into contact with fire and burns, the fire is a real and efficacious cause of the burning, but they believed that Allāh created and deposited the power to burn within the fire and that this power is continuously sustained by him. However, the Qurʾān states that Allāh created everyone and their actions.

On the basis of this āyah (verse), the Māturīdīyyah and the Ḥanābilah would also teach that if the fire were to cause a burn, it is Allāh who is creating the causal activity of the fire and the burn. This view is similar to occasionalism in that Allāh directly creates an effect, but it acknowledges that created substances also have a real influence in producing an effect. This position is essentially concurrentism, which teaches that both Allāh and created substances contribute to producing an effect.

Some non-Sunnī sects, such as the Qadarīyyah and the Muʿtazilah, rejected the idea that Allāh creates the actions of human beings or other created entities [5]. According to these groups, if Allāh created a fire, he would deposit within it the power to burn, and the fire would create a burn on a piece of cotton if they came into contact, but they would deny that Allāh created the burn or willed for it to come into existence in an active sense. They denied that Allāh actively wills every event in the sense that he creates and determines every event. They believed that created agents possess the power to determine and create their own actions without being externally determined to do so. In this model, secondary causation is affirmed, determinism is denied, and human beings are understood to have libertarian free will. However, this view is false because determinism is true.

In a deterministic framework, one may affirm either occasionalism or secondary causation, but libertarian free will must be denied. If occasionalism is true, then Allāh directly creates and determines every event, including human actions. In such a case, libertarian free will is impossible, since people cannot act differently than what Allāh has created and determined them to do. If secondary causation is true, this would mean that Allāh created causes that produce effects, and these effects serve as causes that produce further effects, and this leads to a chain that ultimately determines human decisions. Regardless of which view is correct, if determinism is true, then a person could not have chosen otherwise when they make a decision. This means that regardless of whether one believes in occasionalism or secondary causation, the same problem remains: how can individuals be held morally responsible for their actions if those actions are determined by external factors and the person could not have acted otherwise? Moreover, atheists who affirm determinism while rejecting the existence of Allāh may believe that the laws of physics or nature or some other mechanism determines all events, but they face the same problem as theists who affirm determinism.

Compatibilism, soft determinism, and hard determinism

Different thinkers have approached this problem in various ways; some affirm libertarian free will and reject determinism, while others accept determinism and deny libertarian free will. However, the majority of philosophers tend to endorse compatibilism or soft determinism [6]. Compatibilism is the philosophical position that free will and determinism are compatible and can coexist, but it does not claim that determinism is true or false. Soft determinism is a view that affirms determinism, yet argues that free will still exists. Sometimes the terms are used interchangeably, but it is more accurate to say that all soft determinists are compatibilists, but not all compatibilists are soft determinists.

While compatibilists believe that free will is compatible with determinism, what they mean by free will is not libertarian free will. Libertarian free will is the position that people could have genuinely chosen to act differently in a given scenario, even with the same prior conditions and circumstances. Compatibilists reject libertarian free will because they are determinists. However, they affirm a type of free will known as compatibilist free will. Compatibilist free will is not defined as the ability to do otherwise but as the ability to act according to one’s own desires or intentions, even if those internal states are themselves determined. Essentially, compatibilist free will is the ability to perform voluntary actions.

Sunnī Islām holds a compatibilist position, as it teaches that Allāh wills and creates everything, including human actions. A person cannot do other than what Allāh has determined him to do since a person cannot act until Allāh has created his action. However, a person can also intend to perform an action. An action performed in accordance with one’s will, volition, and intention is a voluntary one, even if it is externally determined. Sunnī theology teaches that Allāh is the Creator of all human actions, whether they are voluntary or involuntary, but moral responsibility only applies to the former because voluntary actions are performed without coercion.

To help explain, imagine an event in which a person voluntarily hops. Initially, this event does not exist, but then Allāh brings the event into existence, including the person’s voluntary act of hopping. Who is the one voluntarily performing the act? It is the person, but who created and determined the event? It is Allāh. From this perspective, human beings possess free will in the sense that they choose to act voluntarily, yet they do not create or determine their acts. Thus, divine creation and compatibilist free will can coexist without contradiction. It cannot be said that the person was forced to hop because coercion implies that an action is performed against one’s will and intention. Allāh does not hold a person accountable for involuntary acts because they occur without a person’s volition, such as sweating, a heartbeat, or the growth of hair, skin, and nails. Essentially, Allāh has willed for each person that they will perform actions, but he has also willed that some of these actions would be performed voluntarily, meaning in accordance with a person’s will, and so a person has the ability to will, but this act of willing is under the framework of the divine will.

However, hard determinists, like libertarians, reject the compatibilist thesis and believe that free will and determinism are incompatible. They believe that genuine free will can only be libertarian and that it must include the ability to do otherwise. Since they are determinists, they do not affirm libertarian free will. Hard determinism is essentially the exact opposite of libertarianism, while compatibilism or soft determinism are middle positions. Hard determinists and libertarians both affirm the existence of voluntary actions, but they oppose labeling the ability to perform such acts as compatibilist free will because they do not hold voluntary acts to be free in a meaningful sense. This is because if determinism is true, even if a person performs a voluntary act at a particular time, such a person could not have done otherwise at that time. Hard determinism was practically the position of the Jabrīyyah sect [7].

The compatibilist rebuttal is that if a person voluntarily chooses to perform a particular action, even if this choice is determined and inevitable, it still qualifies as a real choice because it was made willfully. Indeed, inevitability does not equate to coercion. Harry Frankfurt, a prominent American philosopher, developed a series of counterexamples that are known as Frankfurt cases to argue that moral responsibility and freedom can still exist even when a person makes a decision and could not have done otherwise. Consider for example that a neuroscientist hires a hitman for an assassination. The neuroscientist drugs the hitman and implants a chip in his brain while he is unconscious. If the hitman follows through with the assassination, then the chip will not activate, but if he refuses, the chip will activate and force him to complete the task. Upon waking, the hitman voluntarily chooses to fulfill the contract and assassinates the target, and so the chip never activated. In this scenario, the hitman could not have done otherwise, but the hitman made the decision willingly, and so he is still considered morally responsible for his action. This demonstrates the compatibilist claim that moral accountability and freedom does not necessarily require libertarian free will, which is the ability to do otherwise.

In essence, the debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism ultimately comes down to how one defines free will. Hard determinists and libertarians tend to focus on the causal inevitability of actions, whereas compatibilists emphasize the role of intentionality of actions. Sunnī Islam does indeed teach that actions are ultimately inevitable because everything has been predestined, predetermined, and foreseen by Allāh in advance.

Abū Ad-Dardā reported that the Prophet ﷺ said, "Everything has a reality, and a servant will not reach the reality of faith until he knows that what struck him could never have missed him and that what missed him could never have reached him" (Musnad Aḥmad 27489).

However, Sunnī Islām stresses that people are free in the sense that they can act voluntarily according to their intentions, and so moral responsibility is preserved.

ʿUmar ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb reported that the Messenger of Allāh ﷺ said, "Verily, (the reward of) deeds depend upon their intentions, and every person shall receive (the reward of) what they intended, so whoever emigrated for Allāh and his messenger, then his emigration is for Allāh and his messenger, but whoever emigrated for some worldly gain or to marry a woman, then his emigration is for what he emigrated" (Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī 1).

Does supplication repel the divine decree? Can destiny change?

A Ḥadīth mentions that nothing repels the divine decree except duʿāʾ (supplication), and nothing increases lifespan except righteousness (Jāmiʿ At-Tirmidhī 2139). This might give the impression that events are not inevitable and that the future is not fixed. However, the issue with this understanding is that Allāh has already known, willed, and recorded everything that will occur, thereby making events inevitable. What then is the meaning of this Ḥadīth?

The answer is that there are different levels of Qadr; there is a level of Qadr that is unchangeable and absolute, but there is also a level that can change. For example, Allāh may have decreed an illness for a sick individual. Thereafter, this person supplicates and begs Allāh to cure him, and he later recovers. This person’s duʿāʾ seemed to have repelled the illness that was decreed for him. However, even this change in his condition has been known, willed, and recorded by Allāh in advance, and so it was eternally a part of Allāh’s decree that this person would recover from his illness after he supplicates. Similarly, Allāh may have decreed a particular lifespan for an individual, but due to his righteousness, Allāh decrees an increase in his lifespan, but this change was also known, willed, and recorded by Allāh in advance, and this means that this person’s lifespan did not truly change from an absolute perspective.

Universal will and legislative will

The will of Allāh is categorized into two types: irādah kawnīyyah (universal will) and irādah sharʿīyyah (legislative will). Irādah kawnīyyah refers to what Allāh wills to happen within creation, regardless of whether it is good or evil, belief or disbelief, obedience or sin. In contrast, irādah sharʿīyyah (legislative will) refers to the commandments and prohibitions of Allāh. For example, it is a part of the irādah sharʿīyyah that Allāh has commanded people to worship him alone without any partners. People can violate the irādah sharʿīyyah by engaging in polytheism or idolatry (shirk). However, it is a part of the irādah kawnīyyah that Allāh has willed that people would voluntarily violate the irādah sharʿīyyah, and this decree will certainly come into effect. Thus, no one can resist the irādah kawnīyyah, which is why libertarian free will is negated, as people cannot do other than what Allāh has willed them to do according to his irādah kawnīyyah, but they can choose to voluntarily follow or oppose the irādah sharʿīyyah, which is in line with compatibilist free will.

Some of the Jabrīyyah said that Allāh loves both good and evil because he decreed them both according to his irādah kawnīyyah, but this view is preposterous because Allāh has prohibited certain acts according to his irādah sharʿīyyah, so why would he love them? As for the Qadarīyyah, they opined that it is silly to believe that Allāh prohibits particular acts according to his irādah sharʿīyyah but then wills for people to violate these prohibitions according to his irādah kawnīyyah. They also claimed that it was unjust for Allāh to punish his servants when he willed for them to violate his law. Thus, they believed that the irādah kawnīyyah only includes what is good and that Allāh has not willed for evil to come into existence, but it is creation that has willed it. The response to the Qadarīyyah view is that it is not impossible for Allāh to will into existence what he despises. Furthermore, as explained previously, even though Allāh has willed for some people to disbelieve or commit sin, he has also willed that they would do so voluntarily, which means that people are not coerced to commit evil since they do so in line with their own volition.

Fatalism and defeatism

People have varied reactions to the reality of Qadr. For some, it is a means of great comfort. A believer understands that there is no contradiction between his voluntary actions and the Qadr of Allāh and recognizes that he is only accountable for what lies within his voluntary control, while what is beyond that is entrusted to Allāh. The believer realizes that there is no use worrying over what he has no control over. With this understanding, the believer continues to strive sincerely in the service of Allāh until he departs this world and meets Allāh in such a state. Others, however, respond pessimistically because they question the point of performing deeds, including voluntary ones, if everything is destined. In fact, even the Ṣaḥābah (companions) of Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ asked the same question. The Prophet ﷺ answered that everyone will be facilitated in regard to what he has been created for.

ʿImrān ibn Ḥusayn reported: It was said, "O Messenger of Allāh ﷺ, are the people of the Garden and the people of Hellfire known?" He replied, "Yes." It was said, "Then what is the point of performing deeds?" He answered, "Everyone will be facilitated in regard to what he has been created for" (Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī 6596).

What this means is that those who are destined to go to Hell (Jahannam) will voluntarily perform evil deeds that will lead them to that place, and those who are destined for the Garden (Jannah) will voluntarily perform righteous deeds that will lead them there. To help explain, imagine that a host has invited some guests to a party. The host has a closed list and an open list. The closed list is known only to the host and contains the names of those who are guaranteed to be invited. The open list has a deadline and stipulates that those who complete certain tasks will have their names added to the open list, and they will also be invited to celebrate. Some individuals may not have any concern for the party, or they may assume that their names are already on the closed list, and as a result, they will not work to be added to the open list, while others will work to secure their names on the open list out of fear that their names may not be included on the closed list. The first type of people did not sincerely want to attend the party because had they truly cared, they would have made the effort to be added to the open list instead of assuming that their names were already on the closed list. When the deadline for the open list ends, it is revealed that those who managed to have their names included on the open list already had their names written in the closed list, and those who did not make it on the open list were never included in the closed list.

In this example, the host is Allāh, the party is in Jannah, the closed list represents the Qadr of Allāh, the open list mentions those who will voluntarily work in order to attain Jannah, and the deadline of the open list is death. The compatibility between Qadr and free will is represented by the compatibility of the closed list and the open list. Those who voluntarily strive for Jannah and die in such a state will fulfill the destiny that Allāh has already decreed for them. Thus, a person's voluntary actions are in harmony with their divinely ordained destiny. People should not adopt a fatalistic and defeatist attitude by ceasing to perform righteous deeds on the basis that everything is already destined because they do not know what has been decreed for them [8]. A believer does not use Qadr as an excuse to abandon proper planning, preparation, or precautions in daily life.

Anas ibn Mālik reported: A man said, "O Messenger of Allāh ﷺ, should I tie my camel and trust in Allāh, or should I leave her untied and trust in Allah?” He answered, "Tie her and trust in Allāh" (Jāmiʿ At-Tirmidhī 2517).

Everything is good for a believer

A believer recognizes that the true nature of all events, whether they are good or evil, ultimately comes from Allāh. However, from the perspective of faith, even what appears to be evil can carry a greater good. This is because adversity is not necessarily viewed by the believer in the same way it is perceived by others. A hardship may serve as a means for Allāh to cleanse the believer of sins, to remind him of the punishment of the ākhirah (hereafter), to elevate his rank and status, or to draw him closer to Allāh. Even when a believer commits a sin, it may result in a positive outcome, such as sincere regret, tawbah (repentance), and a renewed motivation to increase in devotion. In this way, the believer sees divine wisdom in all circumstances.

Suḥayb reported that the Messenger of Allāh ﷺ said, "Wondrous is the affair of the believer, for there is good for him in every matter, and this is not the case with anyone except the believer. If he is happy, then he thanks Allāh, and this is good for him, and if he is harmed, then he shows patience, and this is good for him" (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 2999).

Anas ibn Mālik reported that the Messenger of Allāh said, "I am amazed by the believer. Verily, Allāh does not decree anything for the believer except what is good for him" (Musnad Aḥmad 12495).

[1] Traveling to the past is considered impossible by the majority of philosophers and physicists, but the point of the analogy is simply to show that foreknowledge does not contradict free will because foreknowledge of a choice does not cause the choice.
[2] The most extreme adherents of the Qadarīyyah sect fell into kufr akbar (major disbelief) because they denied the classical understanding of Allāh's omniscience and foreknowledge and affirmed open theism. See the article addressing the allegation that Islām teaches open theism.
[3] Another important term when discussing Qadr is Qaḍāʾ. According to the majority of ʿulamāʾ (Islāmic scholars), these terms are interchangeable, but when they are mentioned together, then each term has a different meaning that is specific to it. Qaḍāʾ refers to what Allāh has already known, predestined, and written concerning his creation before creation came into existence, while Qadr refers to the actual manifestation of the Qaḍāʾ of Allāh within creation. Essentially, the first three aspects specifically refer to Qaḍāʾ, while the fourth aspect specifically refers to Qadr.
[4] It is a common misconception that the Ashāʿirah denied causality. In reality, they only denied secondary causation, affirming instead that Allāh is the true and sole cause of all events. The proponents of occasionalism do not necessarily reject the existence of natural laws but maintain that what is labelled as the laws of nature are simply the consistent and habitual patterns that Allāh has established in creation. If he so willed, he can alter these patterns. A flipbook is an effective analogy for understanding occasionalism. In a flipbook, each page seems to cause what happens on the next page. For example, a page that shows cotton touching a fire on one page is followed by a drawing of the cotton burning on the next page. When the pages are flipped rapidly, it gives the illusion of continuous motion and causation. In reality, no page causes the events on any other page, but it is the designer who causes and creates what happens in each page. From the occasionalist perspective, each event of the world is like a page of a flipbook. If Allāh creates each event directly, miracles can be more easily understood. If he so willed, he could place cotton or even people in fire without burning them, he could transform a staff into a snake, he can enable a virgin to give birth, he can enable a person to walk on water, and he can even resurrect those who have passed away. However, miracles would still be possible even if secondary causation were true. Additionally, although occasionalists deny secondary causation, they often use everyday language that appears to contradict their position, such as saying, "I created this appliance," or "that man caused the incident." Of course, the occasionalist maintains that Allah alone is the sole Creator who alone causes everything. Such expressions are used for convenience, and they are not meant to be taken literally.
[5] The Muʿtazilah are Qadarīyyah, but not all Qadarīyyah are Muʿtazilah. The extreme Qadarīyyah denied divine foreknowledge and are kuffār (disbelievers), while the mainstream Qadarīyyah did not deny divine foreknowledge but denied determinism and denied that Allāh creates the actions of people. The Qadarīyyah are essentially libertarians. The mainstream Muʿtazilah and Qadarīyyah are generally not judged to be kuffār but are considered Ahl al-Bidʿah (People of Innovation), meaning those who have heterodox and deviant beliefs that expel them from Sunnī Islām but not from Islām altogether.
[6] Bourget, David, and David J. Chalmers. “Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey.” Philosophers’ Imprint 23 (11), 2023. https://philpapers.org/archive/bouwdp.
[7] The Jabrīyyah and the Qadarīyyah are polar opposites, while Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah (Sunnī Muslims) holds a middle position between the two sects. The Jabrīyyah would use those āyāt (verses) of the Qurʾān that emphasize the sovereignty of Allāh in order to argue against free will, such as Qurʾān 37:96 that mentions Allāh creates the actions of his servants, Qurʾān 16:93 that mentions Allāh guides whom he wills and misguides whom he wills, and Qurʾān 28:6 that mentions that Allāh creates and chooses what he wills and that choice does not belong to creation. As for Qurʾān 37:96 and 16:93, it has already been explained that human beings are capable of voluntary action and that the creative act of Allāh is compatible with the voluntary acts of people. Therefore, the Jabrīyyah are wrong to use these references to deny free will. Regarding Qurʾān 28:6, although it mentions that choice does not belong to humans, the broader context does not imply that humans lack the ability to make any choices at all. Tafāsīr (exegeses) such as Tafsīr Maʿārif al-Qurʾān and others comment on this āyah (verse) and explain that the meaning is that choice does not belong to creation in terms of grand affairs that are exclusive to Allāh, such as creating reality and legislating. Another interpretation is that Qurʾān 28:6 is a response to the idolaters and polytheists (mushrikūn) of Arabia who questioned why was the Qurʾān revealed to Muḥammad ﷺ who was raised as an orphan instead of a rich and elite individual from one of the two great cities, which they considered to be Makkah and Aṭ-Ṭāʾif (Qurʾān 43:31). Allāh responded by saying that he chooses whom he wills from his creation to carry his message and that no person has any choice in this regard. Furthermore, the Jabrīyyah would ignore those āyāt that explicitly affirm free will for human beings and that they may choose to believe or disbelieve, such as Qurʾān 18:29, 74:37, 73:19, and others. The Qadarīyyah would use these āyāt to argue for their position, but they ignored the āyāt that were cited by the Jabrīyyah. Ahl as-Sunnah took all of the āyāt referenced by both sides in a holistic fashion and understood that they are compatible without contradiction, but Qurʾān 81:29 and 76:30 are the main āyāt that Sunnīs cite because they summarize the topic of Qadr; these āyāt state that humans have free will, but their free will is under the framework of the divine will. The Jabrīyyah rejected the former, and the Qadarīyyah rejected the latter, while Ahl as-Sunnah affirmed both.
[8] There are various forms of fatalism, but it is generally defined as the belief that all events and their outcomes are predetermined and inevitable. This belief is often accompanied by an attitude of defeatism, where a person refrains from effort and productivity using destiny as an excuse for inaction. While fatalists are correct in affirming that outcomes are inevitable, their response to this reality is flawed. They fail to recognize that human actions are not separate from destiny but are in fact aligned, and so they are mistaken to think that it is pointless to perform deeds because the actions of people are precisely the means by which they meet their destinies. When someone is invited to follow Allāh's guidance and responds by saying, "Allāh did not ordain guidance for me," a sufficient response is to inform such people that they do not know the future for certainty, and so they cannot be sure if Allāh has ordained guidance or misguidance for them. Therefore, they should be told that Allāh is inviting them to guidance, and so they should accept it.