Why is the universe contingent?

Once the existence and oneness of a necessary being have been established, a natural question follows: what is the nature of the necessary being? Some may propose that the universe itself is the necessary being. However, this view is problematic. The universe can be shown to be contingent, primarily because it is composed of contingent parts. Consequently, the universe as a whole cannot be necessary, and so it must have had a beginning.

1. The universe is composed of contingent parts.
2. A being composed of contingent parts is itself contingent.
3. Therefore, the universe is contingent.

This syllogism is valid. The first premise is generally not disputed by anyone, but the second premise is the main point of contention. The second premise is supported by the principle that a whole composed of contingent parts is itself contingent. A common objection to this premise is that it commits the fallacy of composition, which is the mistaken assumption that what is true of the parts must also be true of the whole. For example, just because each brick in a wall weighs five pounds does not mean the wall itself weighs five pounds. Similarly, it is argued that it does not follow that the universe as a whole is contingent if its parts are contingent.

In response, it is important to note that the fallacy of composition does not apply universally; in some cases, what is true of the parts does extend to the whole. For instance, if each brick in a wall is red, then the wall as a whole is red. Similarly, if the parts of a whole are contingent, then the whole must also be contingent. One may ask: why is a whole that contains contingent parts contingent itself? The answer is that the existence of the whole is dependent upon its parts. Since the parts are contingent, they can fail to exist, and if they can fail to exist, then this renders the whole contingent, as the whole can fail to exist as well. This establishes that the universe is contingent. In fact, what this demonstrates is that the necessary being cannot have contingent parts, so even a multiverse would be contingent.

Immateriality of the necessary being

One may say that perhaps the necessary being is composed of necessary parts but not contingent parts. This is false; the necessary being cannot be composed of literal parts whatsoever because physical parts depend on space, which is the fabric of the universe. If the necessary being depended on the universe, then it would not be necessary because the universe is contingent. Thus, the necessary being cannot be a physical body, and so it has no gender and must be immaterial and incorporeal [1]. This disproves the theology of religions that adopt anthropomorphism and ascribe corporeality and a literal gender to God, such as Mormonism (Doctrine and Covenants 130:22). Furthermore, the necessary being exists without place because it is not dependent upon space, and this is why Muslims believe Allāh (God) exists without place [2].

Abū Hurayrah رضي الله عنه reported: The Messenger of Allāh ﷺ said "…You (Allāh) are Aẓ-Ẓāhir (the Apparent), there is nothing above You, and You are Al-Bāṭin (the Hidden), there is nothing below You…" (Jāmiʿ At-Tirmidhī 3400).

Imām Al-Bayhaqī رحمه الله commented on this ḥadīth and said:

"If there is nothing above him and nothing below him, then he is not a body nor is he in a direction, and he does not have physical specification" (Al-Asmā wa aṣ-Ṣifāt 2:391).

Imām Aṭ-Ṭaḥāwī رحمه الله authored a work to present the ʿaqīdah (creed) of Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah (Sunnī Islām), particularly as transmitted by Imām Abū Ḥanīfah رحمه الله and his two eminent students, Imām Abū Yūsuf رحمه الله and Imām Muḥammad Ash-Shaybānī رحمه الله, and these three aʾimmah (Imāms) were major ʿulamāʾ (Islāmic scholars) during the period of As-Salaf aṣ-Ṣāliḥ (the Righteous Predecessors) [3]. In the work, he mentions:

"He is beyond having limits placed on him, being restricted, or having parts or limbs, nor is he contained by the six directions as created beings are" (Al-ʿAqīdah aṭ-Ṭaḥāwīyyah).

A common objection raised by proponents of corporeal creeds is that anything which is not a body or does not exist in a spatial location is, in fact, nothing. They argue that all that exists must be physical and spatially situated. However, this reasoning is based on a faulty generalization and an inductive fallacy drawn from limited observations. Firstly, the assumption that all existing things are material is not universally accepted. The nature of thoughts, consciousness, and subjective experiences remains a matter of serious scientific and philosophical debate, with many arguing they cannot be fully explained in material terms. Secondly, and this is the most important point, the immateriality of the necessary being is established by the fact that the universe and material entities are contingent, as demonstrated in the following syllogism:

1. The universe is contingent.
2. Material entities depend on the universe.
3. Therefore, material entities are contingent.
4. A necessary being is not contingent.
5. Therefore, a necessary being is not material.

This syllogism is valid. The first premise has already been demonstrated. With respect to the second premise, a material entity is defined as something made of matter, situated in space, and characterized by spatial extension. It then logically follows that material entities require space to exist, and space is a fundamental component of the universe. If the universe is contingent, and material entities depend on the universe, then material entities are contingent. The necessary being is not contingent. Therefore, it logically follows that the necessary being is not material, and so it must be immaterial.

Transcendence or immanence

A commonly asked question is if God is immanent or transcendent. Islam emphatically affirms tanzīh (the transcendence of Allāh), asserting that he is entirely beyond and separate from creation. This does not mean he is in a place outside of the world because this would result in contingency, as space is itself contingent, and so whatever depends on space is also contingent. Allāh is also immanent in the sense that he is able to interact with creation, and he has full knowledge and power over everything [4]. He is not immanent in the sense that he is literally present and contained within creation.

[1] Although Allāh has no gender, the Arabic language employs masculine pronouns when referring to him. Furthermore, while Islām unequivocally rejects anthropomorphism and the attribution of a body to Allāh, the Qurʾān and aḥādīth occasionally utilize language that may be seen as suggesting corporeality for Allāh, such as references to the wajh, yadayn, and ʿayn of Allāh, among others. Wajh, yadayn, and ʿayn literally mean face, hands, and eye, respectively, but when these words are used in reference to Allāh, they are not meant to be taken to mean that Allāh has a physical body. The Ḥanābilah, Ashāʿirah, and Māturīdīyyah, which are three madhāhib (schools of thought) of Sunnī Islām that represent Sunnī ʿaqīdah (creed), slightly differ on how to interpret these references; despite this, there is ijmāʿ (consensus) that these words are not meant to be understood as implying corporeality for Allāh, since explicit Qurʾānic āyāt (verses) state that nothing resembles or is even comparable to Allāh (Qurʾān 42:11, 112:4). Furthermore, the earliest Muslims did not understand these references in a corporeal manner.
[2] Indeed, Allāh is outside of creation, but some ʿulamāʾ (Islāmic scholars) have said that Allāh is neither in creation nor outside of creation; this appears to violate the law of excluded middle, but their statement is clarified with context. What these ʿulamāʾ meant was that since Allāh exists without place, then when it is said that Allāh is 'outside' creation, one should not understand this to mean that Allāh is outside of one particular place but inside some other place. He is not in anything because all spaces, places, and locations are creations, so 'inside' and 'outside' do not literally apply to him because he exists without place. There is no absurdity in this, just as it is not absurd to say that a table is neither satiated nor hungry because to be satiated or hungry does not apply to a table; this would be a category error. However, while Islām teaches that Allāh exists without place, it also teaches that Allāh is above the ʿarsh (throne), which is generally thought to be the largest creation that extends over the rest of creation (Qurʾān 20:5). The Ḥanābilah, Ashāʿirah, and Māturīdīyyah slightly differ on how to interpret Allāh's aboveness over the throne; nevertheless, none of them believe that this means that Allāh is located in and encompassed by a place above the throne, as nothing encompasses Allāh. Many of the earliest Muslims and the ʿulamāʾ understood Allāh's aboveness to be an aboveness of majesty and not an aboveness of direction and location. Unfortunately, some of the Mujassimah, Mushabbihah, and adherents of the Salafī movement believe Allāh exists in a place. The Mujassimah fell into tajsīm by ascribing corporeality to Allāh, and the Mushabbihah fell into tashbīh by likening Allāh to His creation. The Salafī movement generally follows particular offshoots and strands of the Ḥanābilah. The movement as a whole does not hold the view that Allāh exists within a place. As for the Mujassimah and Mushabbihah, they are generally extinct, although some of their ideas still hold influence today. On the other extreme, some hold the view that Allāh is literally everywhere, and this is incorrect. They misinterpret certain āyāt as saying that Allāh is everywhere (Qurʾān 2:115, 50:16). The earliest Muslims understood these āyāt to mean that Allāh is everywhere in the sense that he knows everything and that his malāʾikah (angels) are dispersed everywhere. Indeed, Allāh is not literally in one place, many places, or every place, but he exists without place. To say that Allāh is literally in a place is an affirmation of ḥulūl, which is the belief that Allāh incarnates and dwells within his creation in a literal sense, and this belief is rejected by ijmāʿ.
[3] As-Salaf aṣ-Ṣāliḥ (the Righteous Predecessors) refers to the first three generations of the Muḥammadan ummah (nation). These generations comprise Aṣ-Ṣaḥābah (the Companions), At-Tābiʿūn (the Followers), and Atbāʿ at-Tābiʿīn (Followers of the Followers). To put it briefly, the Ṣaḥābah were those who were in the company of the Prophet ﷺ, the Tābiʿūn were those who were in the company of the Ṣaḥābah, and the Atbāʿ at-Tābiʿīn were those who were in the company of the Tābiʿūn. The Prophet ﷺ stated that the first three generations of his ummah are the best generations (Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī 6429). Consequently, Muslims place great emphasis on the teachings and practices of the earliest Muslims of the ummah for instruction.
[4] The proof that the necessary being is omniscient and omnipotent will be presented in later articles.